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Replicants R Us: The Crisis of  
Authenticity in Blade Runner 
 
 
JOHN BYRON 
 
 
 
Are you genuine? or only an actor? A 
representative? or that itself which is 
represented?—Finally you are no more 
than an imitation of an actor. . . .
1
 
 
 
 
In the manner of much speculative science fiction, the world of 
Ridley Scott's Blade Runner
2
 is both alienating and oddly familiar. The film 
lingers over flash technologies and jarring cultural encounters which 
establish the difference between its world and ours, and yet their continuity 
with our contemporary world is overwhelmingly compelling. Philip K. 
Dick, the author of the novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? upon 
which the film was based,
3
 enthused about the aesthetic achievement of the 
film, saying that its milieu is 'like everything we have now only worse.'
4
 He 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968, first published in German in 1889), p. 37. 
2 Ridley Scott, Blade Runner Director’s Cut (Warner Bros, 1992). Quotations and 
references herein refer to the 1992 Directors Cut, except where noted. The 1982 
original cinematic release is denoted OCR; the 2007 Final Cut is tagged FC. The 
commencing running time of film citations is indicated in square brackets, in the 
format [h:mm:ss]. 
3 Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (London: HarperCollins, 
1993, originally published in 1968). 
4 Dick, quoted in Gregg Rickman, Philip K. Dick: In His Own Words, 2nd ed. (Long 
Beach, CA: Fragments West/Valentine, 1988), p. 220. 
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intends this as compliment: the world of his novel is an environment of 
intense paranoia, oppressive conformity, hyper-simulation, urban chaos, 
massive ecological degradation, eerie depopulation, militaristic 
governmental regulation, and epistemological slippage.  
 
The dystopia of the film is a close match to that of the book: a dark, 
post-apocalyptic world of advanced, unfettered capitalism; chaotic, high-
density urbanisation; and a diminished yet authoritarian government. Blade 
Runner was produced in the early Reagan era, around the same time that 
theorists such as Jean-François Lyotard and Frederic Jameson were drawing 
attention to these same features of the contemporary 'postmodern 
condition'
5
. It is no coincidence that Blade Runner has since been hailed as 
an exemplar of postmodern imagination by a pantheon of cultural theorists,
6
 
and has also served as one of the key inspirational texts for the influential 
cyberpunk movement.  
 
This critical and creative attention is due, in part, to the film-makers' 
replication of Dick's method of extrapolating the conditions of today 
towards their asymptotes, a technique they called 'retrofitting'—the layering 
of imagined artefacts of the future (technology, in particular, but also 
cultural conditions) upon the fabric of lived reality today. This term, 
according to Syd Mead, the film's 'visual futurist' (or conceptual artist), 
'simply means upgrading old machinery or structures by slapping new add-
ons to them [sic].'
7
 Mead's modest account notwithstanding, the method 
resulted in a striking and convincing vision of the future that established 
Blade Runner as an aesthetic precursor to an entire generation of SF films. 
It imbued the movie with a bleak take on a future foreseeably extrapolated 
                                                 
5 Jean-François Lyotard, La Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir (Paris: 
Minuit, 1979); Frederic Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism,’ New Left Review (July-August 1984), 146: 52-92. See also Hal Foster, 
ed., The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, WA: Bay 
Press, 1983), which includes essays by Jameson, Jürgen Habermas, Jean 
Baudrillard, Edward Said and Gregory Ulmer. 
6 Such as ‘Guiliana Bruno, Andrew Ross, Kaja Silverman, Vivian Sobchack and 
Slavoj Žižek.’ Scott Bukatman, Blade Runner BFI Modern Classics (London: 
British Film Institute, 1997), p. 36. 
7 Paul M. Sammon, Future Noir: The Making of Blade Runner (London: Orion, 
1996), p. 79. 
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from certain tendencies in the early 'eighties. Complete with near-total 
environmental degradation, marked social dysfunction and isolation, 
rampantly unethical corporate and state activities, the scene of Blade 
Runner became the perfect metaphor for the sequelae of contemporary 
cultural conditions of late capitalism.  
 
This technique produces 'a combination of the new and the very, 
very used, just like the present.'
8
 But as cyberpunk novelist William Gibson 
notes, it is also about excess:  
 
Scott understood the importance of information density to perceptual 
overload. When Blade Runner works best, it induces a lyrical sort of 
information sickness, that quintessentially modern cocktail of ecstasy 
and dread.
9
 
 
Or, perhaps, quintessentially postmodern. Deckard's world is one of 
pervasive simulation and dissimulation. Furthermore, it is not just about the 
buildings, the institutions and the society: it is also about the humans. 
Nothing is exempt from the condition of generalised 'accelerated 
decrepitude,' Pris's gloss of J.F. Sebastian's physical condition [1:15:12]: 
 
The psychopathology of J.F. Sebastian, the replicants, and the city is 
the psychopathology of the everyday postindustrial condition. The 
increased speed of development and process produces the 
diminishing of distances, of the space in between, of distinction…. 
The postindustrial city is a city in ruins.
10
 
 
In the world of Blade Runner, all is decrepitude and ruination: all, that is, 
except for the replicants. 
 
Technology has advanced to the point where the creation of bio-
engineered adult human simulacra is possible: and since it serves both 
                                                 
8 Bukatman, p. 21. 
9 Quoted in Michael Webb, ‘'Like Today, Only More So': The Credible Dystopia of 
Blade Runner’ in Dietrich Neumann, ed., Film Architecture: Set Designs from 
Metropolis to Blade Runner (Munich & New York: Prestel, 1996): 44-7, p. 45. 
10 Giuliana Bruno, ‘Ramble City: Postmodernism and Blade Runner,’ October 41 
(1987): 61-74, p. 65. 
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commercial and political purposes, this capability has been realised. It is a 
world of cold, clear-eyed pragmatism, which has re-embraced the slave-
driven model of economic development. At the same time, it has refined its 
technological capability to the point where the differences between original 
and copy are not so much diminished as identifiably inverted: the original 
has become degraded while the copy has been perfected. Which is a bit of a 
problem for our eponymous protagonist, Rick Deckard. 
 
The first thing anybody knew about Deckard came from his own 
admission at the start of the original cinematic release in 1982: he is a civil 
service hit-man, 'ex-cop, ex-blade runner, ex-killer' [OCR 0:08:29]. The 
tone and content of his voice-over establishes from the outset his cynicism, 
his self-loathing and his unemployed status. He follows up with the 
observation, 'Sushi, that's what my wife called me—cold fish' [OCR 
0:09:07]. These short sentences immediately place Deckard in familiar 
cinematic territory, particularly when delivered with a flattened 
retrospective voice-over. He is the jaded ex-gumshoe of film noir: 
phlegmatic, emotionally detached (but probably secretly vulnerable), lonely, 
callous, tough on the world and tougher on himself, a survivor with bad 
habits and bad friends, if he has any friends at all. As the film progresses, 
we are confirmed in our initial broad assumptions: Deckard lives alone in a 
tolerably ordered but under-maintained apartment; he drinks too much, 
especially after a traumatic 'retirement'; his seduction style is characterised 
by violence when tenderness fails; he is pettily corrupt; he is intellectually 
uncomplicated but philosophically inclined, in a slightly awkward, street-
wise way. The experienced cinema audience knows Deckard well enough 
from the opening lines and the topoi that follow, as an early 21
st
 century 
version of the familiar, deeply ambivalent hardboiled film noir detective, 
walking the line between the mutually dependent worlds of crime and the 
law.  
 
True to the genre, Deckard is engaged as much in the discovery of 
himself as in the investigation of a case. Notwithstanding the image of the 
tough, self-denying, aggressively outward-looking man of action, the 
archetype is always engaged in a search for identity, a deepening of the 
sense of self even if only through the confirmation that the world is a rotten 
place, and the only person in it that can be depended on is oneself. While 
the noir world is one where moral ambiguity pervades the action, where 
dubious methods are required to achieve imperfect results, the struggle is to 
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maintain 'the weary integrity of the private eye.'
11
 Deckard fits this mould 
perfectly.  
 
Despite being under constant attack as the action develops—
ethically, professionally, physically, ontologically—and displaying a 
distinct lack of authority in any of these respects, Deckard somehow 
remains at the centre of the film's concerns. Indeed, it is perhaps his 
manifest mediocrity, in so many respects, that is the key to the film's almost 
morbid interest in scrutinising this hapless everyman in unflatteringly well-
lit close-up.  
 
Of particular interest is Deckard's emotional unresponsiveness. His 
lack of inflection bespeaks an incapacity for feeling: a question perhaps not 
richly explored in action SF cinema, but one that is developed throughout 
Blade Runner. The question is essential to the unfolding story, since the 
capacity for empathy is the one thing that sets humanity apart from its 
uncanny simulation. The importance of this categorical marker to the blade 
runners is clear enough, since they are tasked with identifying replicants by 
testing them for empathy: and then destroying them. The execution of these 
beings, who in every other respect appear human, requires the suppression 
or neutralisation of their own capacity for empathy. It is therefore essential 
that the blade runner forms a view of replicants that focuses solely upon 
their constructed nature, enabling him to objectify them to the point where 
he does not conceive of them as alive. This is not a new strategy for agents 
of the state involved in combat or conflict: 
 
Moral distance involves legitimizing oneself and one's cause. It can 
generally be divided into two components. The first component usually is 
the determination or condemnation of the enemy's guilt, which, of course, 
must be punished or avenged. The other is an affirmation of the legality and 
legitimacy of one's own cause.
12
 
 
                                                 
11 Lee Horsley, ‘The Development of Post-war Literary and Cinematic Noir,’ Film 
Noir, http://www.crimeculture.com/Contents/Film%20Noir.html, accessed 13 
October 2008. 
12 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War 
and Society (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995), p. 164. 
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Deckard must first privilege empathy in order to 'diagnose' the 
replicants and place them outside the category of being, so that he is then 
exempted from the any requirement for empathy while executing them. 
However the exercise of this capability renders him vulnerable to the 
awareness that he—like many cops in many other movies—is differentiated 
from his quarry by little more than a star made of tin. The significance of 
this awareness lies in the fact that the opposing categories in this film run 
much deeper than just criminal and detective: they are human being and 
organic machine, and the loss of essential difference between these 
conditions of existence is at the core of Deckard's growing crisis. 
 
With all of this going on—his disgust at himself, his loneliness, his 
reluctant return to a job he reviles, his powerlessness before the ruthless 
state, his realisation that little of substance separates him from his 
nonhuman prey—Deckard is ripe for an ontological crisis. As Scott 
Bukatman has it, '[h]is status as a human—physically, psychically, 
morally—is increasingly in doubt. He is, quite simply, out of control.'13 All 
he needs is one little thing to push him over the edge. 
 
Deckard finds his tipping point when he goes to Tyrell's 
headquarters to trial the Voight-Kampff procedure on a new model of 
replicant. Tyrell asks to see it work on a human first: 'I want to see a 
negative before I provide you with a positive' [0:18:17]. While Deckard is 
not convinced of the point of this, he agrees to Tyrell's whim. It is clear that 
Deckard does not suspect anything at all, and yet by the time he has finished 
the test he has arrived at the remarkable conclusion that Rachael is actually 
a replicant who thinks she is a human.  
 
After Rachael leaves the two men alone, the detective challenges the 
technocrat to explain the seemingly impossible: 
 
DECKARD: She doesn't know. 
TYRELL: She's beginning to suspect, I think. 
DECKARD: Suspect! How can it not know what it is? 
TYRELL: Commerce is our goal here at Tyrell. 'More Human than 
Human' is our motto. Rachael is an experiment: nothing more. 
We began to recognise in them a strange obsession. After all, 
                                                 
13 Bukatman, p. 81, emphasis original. 
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they are emotionally inexperienced with only a few years in 
which to store up the experiences which you and I take for 
granted. If we gift them with a past, we create a cushion or a 
pillow for their emotions, and consequently we can control them 
better. 
DECKARD: Memories. You're talking about memories! [0:21:35] 
 
Deckard has clearly had no inkling of this possibility, as his previous 
experiences with replicants under V-K testing are presumably similar to 
those of his colleague Holden with Leon at the beginning of the film: a 
replicant masquerading as a human, aware that he is about to be exposed. 
This new situation seems impossible to him, yet he maintains his 
professional demeanour throughout the test and pushes forward to an 
outcome, despite his failure to understand the results. His confusion is 
manifest in his alternation of pronoun choice when referring to Rachael: 
'She doesn't know' is followed immediately by, 'How can it not know what 
it is?' Throughout the film, Deckard reveals his fundamental categorical 
orientation towards the replicants, through his choice of pronoun.
14
 At this 
point, Deckard reveals his deep uncertainty even though he knows that 
Rachael is a replicant. His ambivalence also manifests increasingly in his 
behaviour, particularly towards Rachael but also, to some extent, towards 
Roy. Most significantly, however, his confusion before the indeterminacy of 
the replicants' status doubles back and begins to prey upon his own 
conception of who—of what—he is himself.  
 
'Memories. You're talking about memories!' This is a moment of 
truth for Deckard, as he realises that no one is safe from doubt about his or 
her ontological status. While Deckard takes some time to absorb the full 
import of the possibility of memory implants, the seed is clearly sown in 
this scene. All of his other dilemmas—his awareness of the moral similarity 
between himself and his quarry, his uncertainty about the ontological status 
of the replicants—come home to him once this final foundation of self-
confidence (literally, confidence in the self) is undermined. For if machines 
can be implanted with memories and be unaware that they are not their own, 
                                                 
14 For example, his voice-over in the death scene refers to Roy as ‘he’ [OCR 
1:43:06]—a point at which Deckard, like many of the critics, has apparently decided 
that Roy transcended his debased condition and earned human status. More on this 
below. 
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then an apparent sense of self is no evidence of the reality of the self at all. 
For any person this would be a frightening, vertiginous realisation, but for 
someone who thinks about these matters constantly, and who acts upon the 
distinction between human and replicant with lethal violence, the 
implications are, if possible, even more dire. 
 
Am I me? Am I human? Am I real?—these are not questions that 
any person ever expects to confront, but Deckard is drawn unavoidably to 
the precipice by the casual fact of the possibility of memory implants. 
Deckard's problem is not merely one of not knowing, of the fact that 
nobody can know any more. From this point forward, clues abound to 
support the possibility that he is in fact a replicant—clues that are 
insufficiently persuasive to bring him to the conclusion that he is one, but 
that are frequent and suggestive enough to keep the idea alive as a very real 
prospect rather than a mere abstract possibility. 
 
Scott Bukatman wrote in 1997 that, 'sometimes it seems that the 
question, 'Is Deckard a replicant?' has generated more discussion on the 
Internet than the existence of God.'
15
 The status of Neo in the Matrix trilogy 
probably holds the record these days, but it is a good line. The question is 
almost ubiquitous in digital resources devoted to the film and is present in a 
good deal of the 'analogue' writing on the film as well. However Bukatman 
makes the perceptive point 'that asking the question is more important than 
determining the answer (and further, it's not about Deckard, it's about us).'
16
 
 
Deckard's dubious ontological status is gradually opened up against 
the unsettling background of the pervasive hyper-simulation of his world. 
His dawning reflection on what it is to be human inevitably take place in the 
context of his thinking about the difference between human and replicant—
his ethical stance with regard to his job of retiring replicants ineluctably 
implicates his ontological self-awareness, particularly since the dominant 
indicator of replicant status is the absence of empathy. However the catalyst 
for his slide into ontological dissonance is his nascent understanding that all 
of the artefacts of memory—photographs, learned behaviours and skills, 
and even intimate recollections—are worthless as guarantors of selfhood. 
                                                 
15 Bukatman, p. 80. 
16 Bukatman, p. 80. 
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The problem is not whether or not another subject is a replicant: the 
problem is that a subject cannot know for sure that she is herself human. 
 
The most commonly cited signifier of replicant status in Blade 
Runner is the presence of red eyes, a device that the attentive audience will 
have observed early in the film in Tyrell's artificial owl, and repeatedly 
(although not unfailingly) in Rachael. The other replicants also show flashes 
of red on occasion although it is not ubiquitous (their status having been 
established early, perhaps it was not deemed necessary). Deckard's eyes 
appear red in the scene with Rachael after she has saved his life by shooting 
Leon [1:02:58], although it must be said his eyes do not reflect red 
elsewhere in the film. This signification of replicant status is strictly a 
cinematic device, designed as 'a tip off for the audience,' according to 
Ridley Scott.
17
 As an item of the film's vocabulary, it is understood to be 
external to the narrative frame and thus unavailable to Deckard as a 
diagnostic tool. It certainly gives the punters plenty to think (and write) 
about, however, when Deckard's slightly out of focus eyes glow red when 
Rachael asks whether he'd hunt her down if she fled: 'No I wouldn't. I owe 
you one. But someone would.' The audience is already alerted to the red-eye 
clue at this moment by Rachael's eyes, which are virtually at their most 
reflective just before Deckard's eyes come into view. It is also probably not 
insignificant that this key sign is shown us in a scene where they are 
discussing the niceties of the hunting down of replicants. The idea that there 
is a serried army of blade runners all waiting to go out into the field adds 
both to the sensation that blade runners are not so dissimilar to the armies of 
replicants, and to the speculation that this particular blade runner is just 
another replicant manufactured to do dirty and dangerous work. 
 
There are other clues laced throughout the film that function clearly 
enough for us, but are for the most part unavailable to Deckard. They 
include:  
the narrative doubling of Deckard and Roy;
18
  
                                                 
17 Sammon, p. 383. 
18 Joseph Francavilla, ‘The Android as Doppelgänger,’ in Judith B. Kerman, ed., 
Retrofitting Blade Runner: Issues in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner and Philip K. 
Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 2nd ed. (Bowling Green, OH: 
Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1997): 4-15, p. 12. 
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the muted interpolation during Rachael's V-K test of Deckard's 
words from a subsequent scene when he proves to Rachael her 
status ('… bush outside your window … orange body, green legs 
…' [0:20:26]);  
the laden significance of Rachael's enquiry of Deckard about 
whether he has ever undergone the V-K test [1:04:39];  
the physiognomic resemblance between Deckard and Holden ('are 
they the same model of [replicant] blade runner?'
19
); and 
the architectural similarity of the Tyrell building and Deckard's 
apartment, both of which are Mayan inspired.
20
  
Additionally, the theory that Deckard is a replicant has been reinforced by 
published accounts of the film-makers' intention to create the suggestion, if 
not the firm conviction, of Deckard's replicant status in the viewer's mind.
21
 
 
The film also contains narrative elements that offer clues to the 
thoughtful audience, while contributing to Deckard's own growing sense of 
disquiet. After Deckard callously dismisses Rachael's photographs and 
memories as evidence of her human status (and after she has fled in 
anguish), he sits down to his piano and looks over his own photographs 
[0:39:55] before succumbing to reverie. Both of these events are recalled 
later in the film: Rachael plays the piano in a subsequent visit to Deckard's 
home, musing about the source of her ability to play (whether the skill is 
hers or Tyrell's niece's); and the unicorn dream becomes relevant in the final 
scene. While this juxtaposition is ironic from the audience's point of view, it 
is also likely to be suggestive to Deckard.  
 
The unicorn dream is already functioning to support the collapse of 
the distinction between Deckard and the replicant even before the 
appearance of the origami unicorn in the film's closing scene: while the 
concept of replicant dream is not explored in the film, the title of the 
novel—Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?—is gently insistent on this 
point. Deckard's dream takes place at a stage when it has become reasonable 
to suppose that replicants, too, may dream, as the gulf between the two 
                                                 
19 Bukatman, p. 81. 
20 Dietrich Neumann, ‘Blade Runner Film Synopsis,’ in Dietrich Neumann, ed.: 
148-52, p. 152. 
21
 See, for instance, remarks made by Ridley Scott and members of the crew in 
Sammon, pp. 359-64 and 390-92. 
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categories of being diminishes. Additionally, the grammar of popular 
cinema provides that dream may be understood to function like memory and 
is somehow linked to it, the one often being mistaken for the other in 
narrative set pieces. Accordingly, Deckard's dream may be written down as 
the equivalent of the replicant memory experience, with the same effect of 
adding to the ledger of experiences common to both replicant and human 
that had been regarded previously as the exclusive preserve of humanity. 
 
More generally, dream and remembering are taken to be 
quintessentially human characteristics, proof of a dynamic psychical life. 
Similarly, the capacity to play the piano, to make music—like Roy's 
capacity to speak poetically at the end of his time—savours of those things 
that we hold to be essential about our humanity. As the story unfolds, it 
becomes apparent to the audience that these phenomena may no longer be 
employed as markers of humanity. This loss of signification takes place 
equally inside the frame of this film: as Deckard sits dreaming, tinkering on 
his piano, he realises that he too can no longer have recourse to these 
phenomena as evidence of his humanity. Equally, it dawns on him that his 
whole life prior to the start of the action may be a fabrication: for all he 
knows, he may have been freshly commissioned, complete with teeming 
memory implants and family photographs, specially to do this job. Like 
Rachael, he can no longer rely on the truth of anything, not even his most 
personal possession: his own life story. 
 
On close inspection, the film begins to offer plenty of evidence—
particularly in the dialogue's word-choice—to support ontological slippage 
once the possibility has been firmly established of the unknowability of 
identity (recalling that Deckard has not just heard about the memory 
implants, he has verified their effect in Rachael). Most of these hints are 
ambiguous, their double meaning possibly only intended for the 
entertainment or provocation of the audience, and it is quite consistent to 
read these titbits as merely ironic, rather than inferential, as 'joking and 
suggestive, rather than definitive.'
22
 Nonetheless, Deckard is gripped by a 
'panic in the face of the superhuman Nexus 6 replicants [which] is a logical 
extension of the anxiety that now marks his character throughout':
23
 he is 
                                                 
22 Bukatman, p. 81. 
23 Bukatman, p. 81. 
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looking for signs, and the possibly innocent turns of phrase adopt an 
ominous alternative meaning for someone looking for clues about his own 
condition. Their sheer frequency, too, could be expected to offset the 
innocent interpretation that could account for them individually.  
 
These hints start modestly with Tyrell's smile in response to 
Deckard's amazement that replicants can be 'gifted' with pasts [0:22:10 ]. 
While this might be an inventor's satisfaction at Deckard's astonishment, or 
a slightly more sadistic pleasure at a human's dawning awareness that 
looking inward is no longer a gauge of subjectivity, it is also plausibly read 
as smug amusement at yet another replicant who is 'beginning to suspect.' 
Later, when Deckard invents an improbable story about being a union 
official from the American Federation of Variety Artists' Confidential 
Committee on Moral Abuses in order to get close to Zhora, she laughs and 
asks him, 'Are you for real?' [0:50:18]—a common enough turn of phrase, 
and understandable in light of the nerdy persona he adopts, but an apposite 
enough one too.  
 
These linguistic tics may be just coincidence or a bit of fun, up to a 
point, but they become more meaning-laden once Roy Batty confronts 
Deckard in the Bradbury Building in the film's final act. Roy,  the leader of 
the rebel replicants who 'even inexplicably knows Deckard's name,'
24
 
increases the ironic weight of his remarks until it seems he is labouring a 
point—probably, that he knows Deckard is having ontological doubts: or 
perhaps, that he knows that Deckard is not human. When Roy enters the 
apartment, Deckard shoots at him and misses: Roy calls out,  
 
Not very sporting to fire on an unarmed opponent. I thought you 
were supposed to be good. Aren't you the 'Good Man'? Come on, 
Deckard: show me what you're made of.  [1:31:28] 
 
This short piece of dialogue plays upon several aspects of Deckard's 
uncertain status at once, and with a dense ambiguity at play in each line. In 
the first sentence, the propriety of his actions is called into question: 
alternatively Roy is making fun of the romantic, humanist notion of 
sportsmanship, a notion that ill suits the life-and-death contest. In the 
second, Deckard's virtue is cast in doubt; or perhaps again it is the idea of 
                                                 
24 Francavilla, p. 10. 
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virtue that is being ridiculed. Then again, the remark is also loaded with a 
critique of his skill, in which case the scorn is for having missed. In the 
third sentence Roy adopts a highly mocking tone on the phrase 'Good Man,' 
his delivery preceded by a pause to emphasise the contested status of the 
appellation: while he does not utter the words 'so-called,' this is clearly 
Roy's meaning, noting that the 'Good Man' is a part to be played, a 
character, a type (the spectre of the production-line haunting his meaning). 
Is Deckard just a replicant cut from a mould to perform the tasks of the 
'Good Man'? This sentence also serves as a bridge to the next: the line that 
teases Deckard about his composition, his essence, his subjectivity: 'Come 
on, Deckard: show me what you're made of.'  
 
Roy develops this idea as the chase continues throughout the 
Bradbury Building. When he catches hold of Deckard, he scornfully asks, 
'Proud of yourself, little man?' which recalls Bryant's threat to Deckard at 
the outset: 'If you're not cop, you're little people' [0:12:42]. He harks back to 
the slight on Deckard's skill in the double meaning above with his next line, 
'Come on Deckard, I'm right here, but you've got to shoot straight.' Deckard 
shoots and misses again. Roy responds with, 'Straight doesn't seem to be 
good enough,' a line that carries a modicum of sexual mockery to it: perhaps 
it is a slight on Deckard's performance; perhaps it presages Roy's 
homoerotic libidinal extravagance to come.
25
 Whichever his meaning, the 
innuendo leads in the next sentence to a linking of Deckard's combat skill 
with his sexual prowess: 'You better get it up, or I'm gonna have to kill you! 
Unless you're alive, you can't play, and if you don't play—.' The slight to 
Deckard's virility suggests the question, 'What kind of man are you?', a 
question with a rather more complex meaning in this context that a simple 
sexual taunt. The line then trails into nonsense, but in dwelling on the state 
of being alive, Roy is taunting Deckard about his own status: human or 
replicant? real or artificial? alive or dead? 
 
The chase concludes with Roy saving Deckard and then sitting down 
to die. Gaff, the annoying familiar of the police chief, is quickly on the 
scene (again), announcing his presence with a statement that leans more 
heavily on the implications for Deckard's subjectivity than even those that 
                                                 
25 The culmination of ‘Rutger Hauer’s fabulously campy performance’ in which Roy 
becomes ‘a kind of homophobic nightmare’ to Deckard, according to Bukatman, pp. 
84-85. 
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precede it: 'You've done a man's job, sir,' he calls out to the exhausted blade 
runner [1:43:48]. Like the rest of these lines, it can be read innocently 
enough: in this case, it could be simply a slightly mannered 
acknowledgement of a job well done, if a little condescending.  But it 
comes across as a quite peculiar formulation. Particularly with the weight of 
Roy's taunts right behind it, it bears the possibility that Gaff knows, or 
thinks he knows, that Deckard is a replicant.
26
 
 
Throughout all this narrative progression, the original cinematic 
release's voice-over offers some insight into Deckard's state of mind. It 
returns constantly to the theme of the contradictions in the replicants' 
humanistic practices, contradictions that are resolved if the distinction 
between replicant and human is obliterated. As the action progresses he 
begins to draw parallels between his own life and the replicant experience. 
Yet despite the OCR's more direct access to Deckard's awareness of the 
parallels between human and replicant, the sensation of his escalating 
ontological paranoia is more directly felt once the safety of the guiding 
voice-over is out of the way. The standard formulation is that in the original 
release, Deckard might be a replicant: in the Director's Cut, he is one.
27
 The 
clincher is supposed to be the unicorn dream [0:40:55], and its correlation 
with Gaff's silver-paper unicorn that he has left outside Deckard's apartment 
[1:47:10]. 
 
Gaff's silver-paper unicorn has been read to indicate that Gaff has the 
same access to Deckard's memories or dreamscape as the latter does to 
Rachael's. Graeme Basset has suggested that this would support the theory 
that Gaff is himself a replicant, as he knowingly references Deckard's 
'private' narrative.
28
 However the theory seems unlikely and unnecessarily 
complex. It is sufficient that Gaff is simply the real blade runner of human 
agency, who is using Deckard as his weapon or tool: there is no need to 
                                                 
26 Incidentally, Edward James Olmos, who played Gaff in Blade Runner, provides 
an intriguing link to the new version of Battlestar Galactica (2003-), the most 
thoroughgoing exploration of the unaware replicant scenario since Scott’s film. 
Olmos plays the pivotal character of Commander (later Admiral) Adama of the 
Galactica. See www.imdb.com/title/tt0407362, accessed 13 October 2008. 
27 See for instance Sammon, pp. 364 and 377. 
28 Graeme Basset, Starburst (53) January 1983, p.5, quoted in William M. Kolb, 
‘Blade Runner Film Notes,’ in Kerman, ed.: 154-77, p. 177n.  
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posit an infinite regression of replicant-controlled replicants (even Tyrell 
does not survive this move!). At any rate, Gaff has an uncanny habit of 
materialising at key moments throughout the film, such as the retirement of 
Zhora [0:57:37] and the death of Roy [1:44:04]. When he returns Deckard's 
gun to him just after Roy expires, it is apparent that Gaff had not only been 
observing the chase (in order to know where the gun fell when Deckard had 
dropped the weapon while scaling a wall [1:34:52]), but that he had been 
close enough to hand to retrieve the weapon while the chase was still 
underway.  
 
Gaff's parting shot—'It's too bad she won't live. Then again, who 
does?' [1:44:24]—is perhaps an observation about the fleeting nature of 
human existence, or it could be a remark about the replicants' foreshortened 
allotment. Whatever the truth of the actual status of the enigmatic Gaff (and 
his own understanding of it), his access to Deckard's inner life is a 
provocative note to the film, and a deeply troubling consideration for 
Deckard. In particular, the unicorn figure is clearly intended to demonstrate 
that Gaff has a power over Deckard—and possibly always has had—that 
transgresses the screen of privacy that individual identity affords. If Rick 
Deckard feels manipulated, he is entitled to feel that it may be due to 
something more than a callous police state exploiting a citizen for its own 
ends. His ontological slippage incorporates and extends the sensation that 
he is merely an instrument of the state, in a more literal sense than he had 
previously suspected. 
 
While Gaff may be either an unpleasant rival or some kind of 
puppet-master, Deckard's nemesis, in the end, is the last surviving and most 
formidable of his prey, Roy Batty. Despite the views of the big box office 
star, who argued that 'the audience needed somebody to cheer for'
29
 in the 
person of Rick Deckard, it is Roy Batty who ultimately assumes the 
subjective centre stage. Deckard's ontological confusion never really 
resolves itself, resulting instead in a kind of resignation, and the playing out 
of the discovery of subjective substance is transferred onto the figure of Roy 
as the film advances. Deckard is decreasingly able to adopt the stance of 
human agency, retreating to the reactions and reflexes of the brainstem. 
Instead, it is Roy who expands into the territory of the human, 
demonstrating an extraordinary facility for all of the rational, philosophical 
                                                 
29 Sammon, p. 362. 
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and creative pre-cortical functions, in combination with a brimming, 
unbridled essence. 
 
The fear of substitution, already rampant in the film as the 
fundamental drive motivating the humans' abhorrence of the replicant, 
drives a maniacal panic in Deckard as battle is closed. The contest for the 
domestication of Roy's exorbitant libidinal energy is played out in the film's 
climactic chase scene [1:30:02 - 1:41:48], in which Roy turns the order on 
its head and pursues hid pursuer, Deckard. As they weave through the 
Bradbury building, Roy ruptures the fabric of urban space in the same way 
that Deckard's Esper machine ruptures the plane of the photograph earlier in 
the film [0:41:47]. Roy's mythicality is most evident in this sequence: the 
laws of physics seem not to apply to him (apart, that is, from the inexorable 
progress of time).  
 
But the fun is gone from the chase for Roy once Deckard attempts 
his desperate leap from the roof of the Bradbury onto a neighbouring 
building. Deckard dangles high above the streets, barely gasping onto a 
girder in an iconic scene of human fragility. Roy, in contrast, stands 
contemplatively, holding a dove in his crossed arms, before leaping 
proficiently across the chasm. His mood serious now, Roy stands above 
Deckard, taking a measure of grim satisfaction from his mortal panic, along 
with a sort of anthropological curiosity: 'Quite an experience to live in fear, 
isn't it? That's what it is to be a slave.' Without signalling his intention at all, 
when Deckard finally loses his grip many stories above street-level, Roy 
catches him by the arm with his punctured hand, and dumps him 
unceremoniously on the rooftop. It is his last vital motion. 
 
When Roy sits down to die, the film employs a dense series of 
mechanisms to inscribe Roy's membership of the order of humanity. His 
quixotic preservation of Deckard's life, his graceful acknowledgment that 
the game is up for him, and his contemplative, regretful tone as he utters his 
last words, all contribute to the late reinvention of this charming villain as 
one of the genuine 'good guys': as one of us. His poignant last speech—
effectively a self-narrated eulogy—is an act of literary seduction that is 
intended to demonstrate to the audience our affinity for this unfortunate 
being in his extremity. It is a beautiful moment that is designed to 
anthropomorphise Roy: poetry, like playing the piano, must surely be the 
mark of humanity (and certainly not of a machine).  
Sydney Studies                                                                        Replicants R Us 
 
57 
 
 
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off 
the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the dark near the 
Tannhäuser Gate. All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in 
rain. — Time to die. [1:41:59] 
 
Roy offers a rueful smile, and bows his head to die, the overcranked camera 
capturing the moment of expiration in voyeuristic slow-motion.  
 
And still this is not all. As Roy's life-force departs him, the dove is 
released into the Director's Cut's only depiction of blue sky.
30
 It is difficult 
to disagree with Bukatman's assessment that this is 'easily the most banal 
image in the film.'
31
 This scene reprises the Christ imagery already 
introduced when Roy pierced his hand with a nail to stimulate his failing 
body during the chase. The imagery clearly suggests redemption and 
transcendence after an exhausting trial. Leaving nothing to hermeneutic 
chance, the original cinematic release makes the case in Deckard's voice-
over (which had been silent for over 46 minutes of film):  
 
I don't know why he saved my life. Maybe in those last moments he 
loved life more than he ever had before. Not just his life; anybody's 
life. My life. All it wanted was the same answers the rest of us 
wanted: where do I come from? where am I going? how long have I 
got? All I could do was sit there and watch him die. [OCR 1:43:02] 
 
A significant majority of the Blade Runner criticism regards this scene as a 
Damascene conversion for Roy, as though he has entered into some kind of 
state of grace: specifically, a sublime state of humanity. Joseph Francavilla 
argues that 'in saving Deckard, he understands he is saving until the last 
                                                 
30 Mercifully edited out in the 2007 FC. The 1982 OCR includes a sequence at the 
very end showing Deckard and Rachael driving through the green countryside under 
a blue sky after fleeing the city. Its temporal proximity to the blue sky in Roy’s 
death scene retrospectively diminishes the effect of the death scene somewhat, so its 
corniness only came into stark relief in the 1992 DC. 
31 Bukatman, p. 85. Not that the FC is free of banality: in the enthralling meeting 
between Roy and his maker, Eldon Tyrell, the FC substitutes the menacing ‘I want 
more life, fucker’ of the earlier versions with the anodyne, for-TV bowdlerisation, ‘I 
want more life, father’ [1:20:18]. 
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minute that part of himself which is truly human.'
32
 Ridley Scott considers 
that Roy's actions are 'an endorsement in a way, that the character is more 
human than human, in that he can demonstrate a very human quality.'
33
 
Charles Lippincott feels that the ending is saying, 'Look at how human the 
replicants are.'
34
 Norman Spinrad, Dick's long-time friend, in discussing the 
translation of the book to the screen, claims that  
 
when the dying replicant Roy Batty, who moments before was 
relishing the slow, sadistic death he had been inflicting on Deckard 
in vengeance for Deckard's cold extermination of his comrades, 
reaches out his hand and saves Deckard's life after visible 
consideration at death's door, Blade Runner achieves the ultimate in 
true faithfulness to the novel. 
In a scene that was not in the book, it poignantly and forcefully 
manifests Dick's true meaning in entirely cinematic terms, that 
'human' and 'android' are moral and spiritual definitions and not a 
matter of protoplasm. That, by achieving empathy, a manufactured 
creature can gain its humanity, just as by losing it, a natural man can 
become a human android.
35
 
 
Later in his book, Spinrad sums up the pro-transubstantiation position, when 
he argues that 'What raises the android [sic] Roy Batty to human status in 
Blade Runner is that, on the brink of his own death, he is able to empathize 
with Deckard.'
36
 
 
Critics do not determine a film's meaning, however, and it would be 
a simple enough move simply to quarantine the reading of Blade Runner 
from the views of its critics, were it not for the fact that the film provides a 
substantial (if not unambiguous) basis for the criticism's humanist-patriotic 
fervour. The film bends its own rules in a quite deliberate attempt at 
seduction: it is not enough that Deckard survives and Roy dies: it is crucial 
                                                 
32 Francavilla, p. 11. 
33 Ridley Scott, quoted in Sammon, p. 193. 
34 Charles Lippincott, quoted in Sammon, p. 195. 
35 Norman Spinrad, Science Fiction in the Real World (Carbondale & Edwardsville, 
IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1990), p. 89. 
36 Spinrad, p. 210. 
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that Deckard survives because Roy dies. Not only that, but Roy has to die in 
a state of acute existential awareness. That is why it is important to the 
film's logic that Deckard's deliverance comes courtesy of Roy's unexplained 
early obsolescence. The replicant has been cheated of 2 months from his 4-
year allotment, the equivalent of shortening a human male's lifespan by 3¼ 
years.
37
 This truncation of his lifespan adds a heightened sense of panic and 
compression to the action, as Roy senses that not even the appalling 
conditions of slavery are to be applied fairly. His persistence is a matter of 
pure will, ensuring that the timing of his death is a question of 
consciousness and not coincidence. Had Roy simply happened to expire at 
the moment he had Deckard's life in his hands, his behaviour would have 
been less attributable to an internal state than to an almost reflexive 
response to the shutdown protocols. And of course, had Roy still two more 
months to live and therefore not been confronting death in the very fibres of 
his being, his sudden access of mercy towards Deckard would have been 
implausible, in light of the fate of his other victims (such as Chew, Tyrell 
and even the unfortunate Sebastian). As it is, with his life bleeding away 
before his time, and his endurance entirely a function of his mind, Roy's 
attitudes and actions at his moment of grace are clearly intentional, in both 
the common and philosophical senses. The rather convenient device—of 
having Roy hold onto his foreshortened life by sheer effort of will, until he 
has Deckard within his power—enables the film not only to negate the 
threat to the human order constituted by the clearly superior replicant, but 
also to completely neutralise that threat through a kind of deathbed 
conversion by proxy. With Deckard an ontological lost cause, the film 
attempts a recovery of its equilibrium on the question of the threatened 
categorical integrity of humanity by the means of Roy's assumption to 
human status. It is not enough for the replicant to be beaten: he must first be 
made an honorary human, to remove the category of the alternative. The 
film is ambivalent on this score, performing this sleight of hand while 
simultaneously sustaining interest in Deckard as a more humble, complex 
and divided being who denies the logic of opposition and reclaims his right 
to choose how to live. The critics are not ambivalent at all: the conservative 
impetus expressed in Roy's death scene is enthusiastically endorsed by most 
of the commentariat.  
                                                 
37 Calculation based on ABS life expectancy estimates for an Australian male born 
2002-4 of 78.1 years. Dennis Trewin, Year Book Australia 2007 [Number 89] 
(Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007), pp. 129-30. 
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The only problem is that this move does not really work. 
 
Roy constitutes a threat to the order because the sole mark of his 
difference to the human is his perfection. The situation is, in one sense, too 
much for the text to handle. Blade Runner's deployment of his superiority is 
ambivalent, even cautious, although the film draws a good portion of 
narrative energy from Roy's paradoxical relation to humanity, particularly in 
the final acts. Whatever his contribution, the film is ultimately unable to 
tolerate the categorical offence to the human order that his existence 
constitutes, even as it celebrates his singularity. It is as though Roy is truly 
monstrous, his exorbitance frighteningly out of the control of the cinematic 
directive once it has been unleashed, and so the closure of his 'story' is 
constructed to contain the assault on subjective propriety which he 
constitutes. Whereas Deckard is ostensibly the figure of identification in the 
film, Roy is unstable, a mythical creature, a threat to the order which must 
be checked, contained, harnessed or, failing that, destroyed. Deckard's 
dilemma threatens his own reliance upon the ontological order (his 
ontological paranoia pulling the rug out from under himself), but Roy 
threatens it from the outside, with audacity and impunity. Deckard is mired 
in the same ontological mess as the rest of us, with a savage twist, but Roy 
is unfettered by these complexities: he is free to self-create, to 'revel in his 
time,' in the words of his creator [1:22:02]. Roy deconstructs the meaning of 
what it is to be a human being: not giving a damn for the 'human,' and 
recognising that the valid category is being. The film's commitments to the 
Cartesian order will not allow such a violation of the rules of engagement to 
stand unchallenged.  
 
On the other hand, Deckard himself represents the possibility of the 
detachment of the individual from the order of the human, where 
membership of that tribe demands submission to the logic that ordains the 
annihilation of the other—in this case, the replicant. The moral logic of the 
film opposes that order as well, and Deckard's ontological and ethical 
struggle is an instance of the obligation of the individual to live ethically, 
and to pursue self-awareness regardless of the pressure to submit. In leaving 
with Rachael, Deckard is ultimately joining Roy in his refusal to submit to 
the order and his determination to make his own play. Roy's mode of 
exuberant being has offered Deckard a glimpse of life unconstrained by 
'humanness.' Like Roy, Deckard only truly becomes a subject when he 
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makes this leap of faith in himself. It is a long way from a happy-ever-after 
ending but, along with hope and some small measure of time, it offers 
dignity and a kind of integrity.  
 
On this reading, it is not important to resolve the question of whether 
Deckard is a replicant: it is not even important to Deckard himself, although 
he would be likely to differ on this point. But the categorical distinction 
between the nature of human existence and the replicant condition 
collapses, as the contingency and constructedness of consciousness puts us 
all in the same boat. We see that Deckard's question to Tyrell about 
Rachael—'How can it not know what it is?' [0:21:40]—was always its 
inverse, applied to himself: 'How can I know what I am?' Deckard is in a 
position to realise, finally, that the question does not demand an answer, 
because it can no longer have an answer. The challenge for the Blade 
Runner viewer, of course, is to empathise with Deckard, to put ourselves in 
his shoes, and to ask: How can any of us know what we are? 
 
'The Deckard question' does not go far enough, then, in one sense, 
and is ultimately irrelevant in another. On the one hand, the discussion tends 
be absorbed in questions of evidence, ignoring the further implications of a 
positive answer: what does it mean for a man to discover that he is in fact a 
machine? On the other hand, and more to the point, it overlooks the 
possibility that Blade Runner presents us with a situation where all 
ontological certainty is erased, in a more practical and fundamental way 
than the incomplete scepticism of the Cartesian Cogito.
38
 Deckard/Descartes 
is racked with doubt, only without the possibility of a retreat to theology to 
re-establish the foundations of his system of selfhood.
39
 When there is no 
way of knowing whether one is, in fact, a replicant implanted with 
memories, or an 'authentic' human possessed of one's 'own' memories, the 
point is that the difference is effectively collapsed. It is no longer an 
epistemological question of whether one can know one's status: it is a post-
                                                 
38 René Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1637: and Meditations on First 
Philosophy, 1641. Reprinted in English in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
ed. and trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1984–91), vols. 1 & 2 respectively. 
39 Philip Dick’s homophone was spotted by Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the 
Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham & London: Duke UP, 
1993), p. 12.  
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ontological question of the ruin of the distinction upon which such 
knowledge is founded. The simulacrum is, effectively, the real, and 
therefore the category of 'the authentic' has disintegrated under the pressure 
of the challenge to its hegemony, and is itself rendered meaningless.  
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